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The means for expressing cruelty and carrying out 
mass killing have been fully developed. It is too 
late to stop the technology. It is to the psychol-
ogy that we should now turn. 
-Jonathan Glover, Humanity, 2001, p. 144 
The twentieth century is often said to have been the 
bloodiest century in recorded history. In addition 
to its wars, it witnessed many grave and widespread 
human rights abuses. But what stands out in histori-
cal accounts of those abuses, perhaps even more than 
the cruelty of their perpetration, is the inaction of by-
standers. Why do people and their governments re-
peatedly fail to react to genocide and other mass-scale 
human rights violations( 
There is no simple answer to this question. It is 
not because people are insensitive to the suffering of 
their fellow human beings-witness the extraordinary 
efforts an individual will expend to rescue a person in 
distress. It is not because people only care about iden-
tifiable victims of similar skin color who live nearby: 
witness the outpouring of aid from the north to the 
victims of the December 2004 tsunami in Southeast 
Asia. Nor can the blame be apportioned entirely 
to political leaders. Although President George W. 
Bush was unresponsive to the murder of hundreds of 
thousands of people in Darfur, it was his predecessor, 
President Bill Clinton, who ignored the genocide in 
Rwanda, and President Franldin D. Roosevelt who for 
too long did little to stop the Holocaust. The Ameri-
can example of inaction has been largely repeated in 
other countries as well. Behind every leader who ig-
nored mass murder were millions of citizens whose 
indifference allowed the inaction to pass. 
Every episode of mass murder is distinct and raises 
unique social, economic, military, and political ob-
stacles to intervention. We therefore recognize that 
geopolitics, domestic politics, or failures of individual 
leadership have been important factors in particular 
episodes. But the repetitiveness of such atrocities, 
which have been ignored by powerful people and na-
tions and by the general public, calls for explanations 
that may reflect some fundamental deficiency in our 
humanity-a deficiency not in our intentions, but in 
our very hardware, and a deficiency that once identi-
fied might possibly be overcome. 
One fundamental mechanism that may play a role 
in many, if not all, episodes of mass-abuse neglect 
involves the capacity to experience affect, the posi-
tive and negative feelings that combine with reasoned 
analysis to guide our judgments, decisions, and ac-
tions. Research shows that the statistics of mass rights 
violations or genocide, no matter how large the num-
bers, fail to convey the true meaning of such atroci-
ties. The numbers fail to spark emotion or feeling and 
thus fail to motivate action. The genocide in Darfur 
is real, but we do not "feel" that reality. We examine 
below ways that we might make genocide "feel real" 
and motivate appropriate interventions. Ultimately, 
however, we conclude that we cannot only depend 
on our intuitive feelings about these atrocities. In ad-
dition, we must create and commit ourselves to in-
stitutional, legal, and political responses based upon 
reasoned analysis of our moral obligations to stop 
large-scale human rights violations. 
lessons from Psychology 
In 1994, Romeo Dallaire, the commander of the tiny 
UN peacekeeping mission in Rwanda, was forced 
to watch helplessly as the slaughter he had foreseen 
and warned about began to unfold. Writing of this 
massive humanitarian disaster a decade later, he en-
couraged scholars "to study this human tragedy and 
to contribute to our growing understanding of the 
genocide. If we do not understand what happened, 
how will we ever ensure it does not happen againr" 
(Dallaire, 2005, p. 548). 
Researchers in psychology, economics, and a mul-
tidisciplinary field called behavioral decision theory 
have developed theories and findings that, in part, 
begin to explain the pervasive underresponse to 
atrocity. 
Affect, Attention, Information, and Meaning 
The search to identifY a fundamental mechanism in 
human psychology that causes us to ignore mass mur-
der and genocide draws upon a theoretical framework 
that describes the importance of emotions and feel-
ings in guiding decision making and behavior. Per-
haps the most basic form of feeling is affect, the sense 
(not necessarily conscious) that something is good 
or bad. Positive and negative feelings occur rapidly 
and automatically-note how quickly it takes to sense 
the feelings associated with the word joy or the word 
hate. A large research literature in psychology has 
documented the importance of affect in conveying 
meaning upon information and motivating behavior 
(Barrett and Salovey, 2002; Clark and Fiske, 1982; 
Forgas, 2000; LeDoux, 1996; Mowrer, 1960; Tom-
kins, 1962, 1963; Zajonc, 1980). Without affect, in-
formation lacks meaning and will not be used in judg-
ment and decision malting (Loewenstein eta!., 2001; 
Slovic et al., 2002). 
Affect plays a central role in what are known as 
"dual-process theories" of thinking. As Epstein 
(1994) observed, "There is no dearth of evidence in 
every day life that people apprehend reality in two 
fundamentally different ways, one variously labeled 
intuitive, automatic, natural, nonverbal, narrative, 
and experiential, and the other analytical, deliberative, 
verbal, and rational" (p. 710). 
Stanovich and West (2000) labeled these two 
modes of thinking System 1 and System 2. One of 
the characteristics of System 1, the experiential or in-
tuitive system, is its affective basis. Although analysis 
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(System 2) is certainly important in many decision-
making circumstances, reliance on affect and emotion 
is generally a quicker, easier, and more efficient way 
to navigate in a complex, uncertain, and sometimes 
dangerous world. Many theorists have given affect a 
direct and primary role in motivating behavior. 
Underlying the role of affect in the experiential 
system is the importance of images, to which positive 
or negative feelings become attached. Images in this 
system include not only visual images, important as 
these may be, but words, sounds, smells, memories, 
and products of our imagination. 
Kahneman (2003) noted that one of the functions 
of System 2 is to monitor the quality of the intui-
tive impressions formed by System 1. Kahneman and 
Frederick (2002) suggested that this monitoring is 
typically rather lax and allows many intuitive judg-
ments to be expressed in behavior, including some 
that are erroneous. This point has important implica-
tions that will be discussed later. 
In addition to positive and negative affect, more 
nuanced feelings such as empathy, sympathy, compas-
sion, and sadness have been found to be critical for 
motivating people to help others (Coke, Batson, and 
McDavis, 1978; Dickert and Slovic, 2009; Eisenberg 
and Miller, 1987). As Batson (1990) put it, "consid-
erable research suggests that we are more likely to 
help someone in need when we 'feel for' that person." 
(p. 339). 
A particularly important psychological insight 
comes from Haidt (2001, 2007; see also Van Berkum 
et al., 2009), who argued that moral intuitions (akin 
to System l) precede moral judgments. Specifically, 
he asserted that 
moral intuition can be defined as the sudden 
appearance in consciousness of a moral judg-
ment, including an affective valence (good-bad, 
like-dislike) without any conscious awareness of 
having gone through steps of searching, weighing 
evidence, or inferring a conclusion. Moral intu-
ition is therefore ... alcin to aesthetic judgment. 
One sees or hears about a social event and one 
instantly feels approval or disapproval. (p. 818) 
In other words, feelings associated with moral in-
tuition usually dominate moral judgment, unless we 
make an effort to use judgment to critique and, if 
necessary, override intuition. Not that our moral in-
tuitions are not, in many cases, sophisticated and ac-
curate. They are much lilce human visual perception in 
. this regard-equipped with shortcuts that most of the 
time serve us well but occasionally lead us seriously 
astray (Kahneman, 2003). Indeed, lilce perception, 
which is subject under certain conditions to visual il-
lusions, our moral intuitions can be very misguided. 
We shall demonstrate this in the following sections 
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and argue that, in particular, our intuitions fail us in 
the face of genocide and mass atrocities. That failure 
points to the need to create laws and institutions that 
are designed to stimulate reasoned analysis and that 
can help us overcome the deficiencies in our ability.to 
feel the need to act. 
Affect, Analysis, and the Value of Human Lives 
How should we value the saving of human lives? A 
System 2 answer would look to basic principles or 
fundamental values for guidance. For example, Ar-
ticle 1 of the United Nations Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights asserts, "All human beings are born 
free and equal in dignity and rights." We might infer 
from this that every human life is of equal value. If 
so, the value of saving N lives is N times the value of 
saving one life, as represented by the linear function 
in figure 7 .l. 
An argument can also be made for judging large 
losses of life to be disproportionately more serious 
because they threaten the social fabric and viability of 
a group or community, as in genocide (fig. 7.2). De-
bate can be had at the margins over whether govern-
ments have a duty to give more weight to the lives of 
their own people, but something approximating the 
equality of human lives is rather uncontroversial. 
How do we actually value human lives? Research 
provides evidence in support of two descriptive mod-
els, which are linked to affect and intuitive, System 1 
thinking, that reflect values for lifesaving that are pro-
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Number of lives saved 
7.1. A normative model for valuing the saving of human 
lives. Every human life is of equal value. 
Number of lives 
7.2. Another normative model: large losses threaten the 
viability of the group or society. 
foundly different from the normative models shown 
in figures 7.1 and 7.2. Both of these descriptive mod-
els demonstrate responses that are insensitive to large 
losses of human life and consistent with apathy to-
ward genocide. 
The Psychophysical Model 
Affect is a remarkable mechanism that enabled hu-
mans to survive the long course of evolution. Before 
there were sophisticated analytic tools such as prob-
ability theory, scientific risk assessment, and cost/ 
benefit calculus, humans used their senses, honed by 
experience, to determine whether the animal lurking 
in the bushes was safe to approach or the murky water 
in the pond was safe to drink. Simply put, System 1 
thinking evolved to protect individuals and their small 
family and community groups from present, visible, 
immediate dangers. This affective system, however, 
did not evolve to help us respond to distant, mass 
murder. As a result, System 1 thinking responds to 
large-scale atrocities in ways that System 2 delibera-
tion, if activated, finds reprehensible. 
Fundamental qualities of human behavior are, of 
course, recognized by others beside scientists. The 
American writer Annie Dillard (1999) cleverly dem-
onstrated the limitation of our affective system as 
she sought to help us understand the humanity of 
the Chinese nation: "There are 1,198,500,000 peo-
ple alive now in China. To get a feel for what this 
means, simply take yourself-in all your singularity, 
importance, complexity, and love.;_and multiply by 
1,198,500,000. See? Nothing to it" (p. 47, italics 
added). 
We quickly recognize that Dillard was joking when 
she asserted "nothing to it." We know, as she did, that 
we are incapable of feeling the humanity behind the 
number 1,198,500,000. The circuitry in our brain is 
not up to this task. This same incapacity was purport-
edly echoed by the Nobel Prize-winning biochem-
ist Albert Szent-Gyi:irgyi as he struggled to compre-
hend the possible consequences of nuclear war: "I am 
deeply moved if I see one man suffering and would 
risk my life for him. Then I talk impersonally about 
the possible pulverization of our big cities, with a 
hundred million dead. I am unable to multiply one 
man's suffering by a hundred million." 
There is considerable evidence that our affective 
responses and the resulting value we place on saving 
human lives may follow the same sort of "psycho-
physical function" that characterizes our diminished 
sensitivity to a wide range of perceptual and cognitive 
entities-brightness, loudness, heaviness, and nioney-
as their underlying magnitudes increase. 
What psychological principle lies behind this in-
sensitivity? In the nineteenth century, E. H. Weber 
(1834) and Gustav Fechner (1860/1912) discovered 
a fundamental psychophysical principle that describes 
how we perceive changes in our environment. They 
found that people's ability to detect changes in a 
physical stimulus rapidly decreases as the magnitude 
of the stimulus increases. What is known today as We-
ber's law states that in order for a change in a stimulus 
to become just noticeable, a fixed percentage must be 
added. Thus, perceived difference is a relative mat-
ter. To a small stimulus, only a small amount must be 
added to be noticeable. To a large stimulus, a large 
amount must be added. Fechner proposed a logarith-
mic law to model this nonlinear growth of sensation. 
Numerous empirical studies by S. S. Stevens ( 1975) 
have demonstrated that the growth of sensory magni-
tude ( \jf) is best fit by a power function of the stimulus 
magnitude cp, 
\jf= kcp~, 
where the exponent ~ is typically less than one for 
measurements of phenomena such as loudness, 
brightness, and even the value of money (Galanter, 
1962). For example, if the exponent is 0.5, as it is in 
some studies of perceived brightness, a light that is 
four times the intensity of another light will be judged 
only twice as bright. 
Remarkably, the way that numbers are represented 
mentally may also follow the psychophysical func-
tion. Dehaene (1997) described a simple experiment 
in which people are asked to indicate which of two 
numbers is larger: 9 or 8? 2 or 1? Everyone gets the 
answers right, but it takes more time to identifY 9 as 
larger than 8 than to indicate 2 is larger than l. From 
experiments such as this, Dehaene concluded that 
"our brain represents quantities in a fashion not un-
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3 
Number of lives at risk 
7.3. A psychophysical model describing how the saving 
of human lives may actually be valued. 
like the logarithmic scale on a slide rule, where equal 
space is allocated to the interval between I and 2, 2 
and 4, or between 4 and 8" (p. 76). Numbers 8 and 
9 thus seem closer together or more similar than I 
and2. 
Our cognitive and perceptual systems seem de-
signed to sensitize us to small changes in our envi-
ronment, possibly at the expense of malting us less 
able to detect and respond to large changes. As the 
psychophysical research indicates, constant increases 
in the physical magnitude of a stimulus typically evoke 
smaller and smaller changes in response. Applying this 
principle to the valuing of human life suggests that a 
form of psychophysical numbing may result from our 
inability to appreciate losses of life as they become 
larger (fig. 7.3). The function in figure 7.3 represents 
a value structure in which the importance of saving 
one life is great when it is the first, or only, life saved 
but diminishes marginally as the total number of lives 
saved increases. Thus, psychologically, the importance 
of saving one life is diminished against the background 
of a larger threat-we will likely not "feel" much dif-
ference, nor value the difference, between saving 87 
lives and saving 88. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) incorporated this 
psychophysical principle of decreasing sensitivity into 
prospect theory, a descriptive account of decision mak-
ing under uncertainty. A major element of prospect 
theory is the value function, which relates subjective 
value to actual gains or losses. When applied to human 
lives, the value function implies that the subjective 
value of saving a specific number of lives is greater for 
a smaller tragedy than for a larger one. 
Fetherstonhaugh et a!. ( 1997) demonstrated this 
potential for diminished sensitivity to the value of 
life-that is, psychophysical numbing-in the context 
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of evaluating people's willingness to fund various life-
saving interventions. In a study involving a hypotheti-
cal grant-funding agency, respondents were asked to 
indicate the number of lives a medical research in-
stitute would have to save to merit receipt of a $10 
million grant. Nearly two-thirds of the respondents 
raised their minimum benefit requirements to warrant 
funding when there was a larger at-risk population, 
with a median value of9 ,000 lives needing to be saved 
when 15,000 were at risk, compared to a median of 
100,000 lives needing to be saved out of 290,000 at 
risk. By implication, respondents saw saving 9,000 
lives in the smaller population as more valuable than 
saving ten times as many lives in the larger population. 
Other studies in the domain oflifesaving interven-
tions have documented similar psychophysical numb-
ing or proportional reasoning effects (Baron, 1997; 
Bartels and Burnett, 2006; Fetherstonhaugh et al., 
1997; Friedrich et al., 1999; Jenni and Loewenstein, 
1997; Ubel, Baron, and Asch, 2001). For example, 
Fetherstonhaugh et al. ( 1997) also found that people 
were less willing to send aid that would save 4,500 
lives in Rwandan refugee camps as the size of the 
camps' at-risk population increased. Friedrich et al. 
(1999) found that people required more lives to be 
saved to justifY mandatory antilock brakes on new 
cars when the alleged size of the at-risk pool (annual 
braking-related deaths) increased. 
These diverse studies of lifesaving demonstrate that 
the proportion of lives saved often carries more weight 
than the number of lives saved when people evaluate 
interventions. Thus, extrapolating from Fetherston-
haugh et al., one would expect that, in separate evalu-
ations, there would be more support for saving 80% of 
100 lives at risk than for saving 20% of l ,000 lives at 
risk. This is consistent with an affective (System 1) ac-
count, in which the number of lives saved conveys little 
affect but the proportion saved carries much feeling: 
80% is clearly "good" and 20% is "poor." 
Slovic et al. (2004), drawing upon the finding that 
proportions appear to convey more feeling than do 
numbers of lives, predicted (and found) that college 
students, in a between-groups design, would more 
strongly support an airport-safety measure expected 
to save 98% of 150 lives at risk than a measure ex-
pected to save ISO lives. Saving 150 lives is diffusely 
good, and therefore somewhat hard to evaluate, 
whereas saving 98% of something is clearly very good 
because it is so close to the upper bound on the per-
centage scale and hence is highly weighted in the sup-
port judgment. Subsequent reduction of the percent-
age of 150 lives that would be saved to 95%, 90%, and 
85% led to reduced support for the safety measure, 
but each of these percentage conditions still garnered 
a higher mean level of support than did the "save 150 
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7.4. Airport safety study: saving a percentage of 150 
lives receives higher support ratings than does saving 
150 lives. 
Note: Bars describe mean responses to the question, 
How much would you support the proposed measure to 
purchase new equipment? The response scale ranged 
from 0 (would not support at all) to 20 (very strong 
support). 
(Data derived from table 23.4, page 408, from chapter 23, "The 
Affect Heur'1stic," Slovic et al., Heuristics and Biases: The Psy-
chology of Intuitive Judgment, edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale 
Griffin and Daniel Kahneman. Copyright© 2002, Cambridge 
University Press. Adapted with permission.) 
This research on psychophysical numbing is im-
portant because it demonstrates that the feelings 
necessary for motivating lifesaving actions are not 
congruent with the normative models in figures 7.1 
and 7.2. The nonlinearity displayed in figure 7.3 is 
consistent with the disregard of incremental loss of 
life against a background of a large tragedy. However, 
it does not fully explain apathy toward genocide, be-
cause it implies that the response to initial loss of life 
will be strong and maintained, albeit with diminished 
sensitivity, as the losses increase. Evidence for a sec-
ond descriptive model, better suited to explain apathy 
toward genocide, follows. 
Numbers and Numbness: Images and Feeling 
Psychological theories and data confirm what keen 
observers of human behavior have long known. Nu-
merical representations of human lives do not neces-
sarily convey the importance of those lives. All too 
often the numbers represent dry statistics, "human 
beings with the tears dried off," that lack feeling and 
fail to motivate action (Slovic and Slovic, 2004). 
How can we impart the feelings that are needed 
for rational action? Attempts to do this typically in-
volve highlighting the images that lie beneath the 
7.5. Flags depicting American and Iraqi war dead. 
(Reprinted from "Affect, Moral Intuition, and Risk," Slovic, Paul, 
and Daniel Vastfjall, Psychological inquiry, 21(4), 1.10.2010. 
Reprinted by permission of Taylor & Francis Ltd.) 
numbers. For example, organizers of a rally designed 
to get Congress to do something about 38,000 deaths 
a year from handguns piled 38,000 pairs of shoes in 
a mound in front of the Capitol (Associated Press, 
1994). Students at a middle school in Tennessee, 
struggling to comprehend the magnitude of the Ho-
locaust, collected six million paper clips as a center-
piece for a memorial (Schroeder and Schroeder-
Hildebrand, 2004). Flags were "planted" on the lawn 
of the University of Oregon campus to represent the 
thousands of American and Iraqi war dead (fig. 7.5). 
When it comes to eliciting compassion, the iden-
tified individual victim, with a face and a name, has 
no peer. Psychological experiments demonstrate this 
clearly, but we all know it as well from personal ex-
perience and media coverage of heroic efforts to save 
individual lives. The world watched tensely as rescuers 
worked for several days to rescue 18-month-old Jes-
sica McClure, who had fallen 22 feet into a narrow 
abandoned well shaft. Charities such as Save the Chil-
dren have long recognized that it is better to endow 
a donor with a single, named child to support than to 
ask for contributions to the bigger cause. 
Even Adolf Eichmann, complicit in the murder 
of millions of Jews during the Holocaust, exhibited 
an emotional connection to one of his victims after 
being interrogated by the victim's son for hundreds 
of hours during his 1961 trial in Israel. When the in-
terrogator, Captain Avner Less, reveals to Eichmann 
that his father had been deported to Auschwitz by 
Eichmann's headquarters, Eichmann cried out, "But 
that's horrible, Herr Captain! That's horrible!" (von 
Lang, 1983, p. ix). 
But the face need not even be human to moti-
vate powerful intervention. A dog stranded aboard a 
tanker adrift in the Pacific was the subject of one of 
the most costly animal rescue efforts ever (Vedantam, 
2010). Hearing this, the columnist Nicholas Kristof 
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(2007) recalled cynically that a single hawk, Pale Male, 
evicted from his nest in Manhattan, aroused more in-
dignation than two million homeless Sudanese. He ob-
served that what was needed to galvanize the Ameri-
can public and their leaders to respond to the genocide 
in Darfur was a suffering puppy with big eyes and 
floppy ears: "If President Bush and the global public 
alike are unmoved by the slaughter of hundreds of 
thousands of fellow humans, maybe our last, best hope 
is that we can be galvanized by a puppy in distress." 
The Collapse of Compassion 
In recent years, vivid images of natural disasters in 
Southeast Asia, on the American Gulf Coast, and in 
Haiti and stories of individual victims there brought to 
us through relentless, courageous, and intimate news 
coverage unleashed an outpouring of compassion and 
humanitarian aid from all over the world. Perhaps 
there is hope here that vivid, personalized media cov-
erage featuring victims of genocide could motivate in-
tervention to prevent mass murder and genocide. 
Perhaps. Research demonstrates that people are 
much more willing to aid identified individuals than 
unidentified or statistical victims (Jenni and Loewen-
stein, 1997; Kogut and Ritov, 2005a; Schelling, 1968; 
Small and Loewenstein, 2003, 2005). But a caution-
ary note comes from a study by Small, Loewenstein, 
and Slovic (2007), who gave people leaving a psycho-
logical experiment the opportunity to contribute up 
to $5 of their earnings to Save the Children. In one 
condition, respondents were asked to donate money 
to feed an identified victim, a seven-year-old Mrican 
girl named Rokia. They contributed more than twice 
the amount given by a second group asked to donate 
to the same organization working to save millions 
of Mricans trom hunger (fig. 7.6). Respondents in a 
3r-----------------------------------. 
2 
0 Identifiable life 
(Rokia) 
7.6. Mean donations. 
Statistical 
lives 
(Redrawn from Small et al., 2007) 
Identifiable life 
with statistics 
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third group wete asked to donate to Rokia but were 
also shown the larger statistical problem (millions in 
need) shown to the second group. Unfortunately, 
coupling the statistical realities with Rokia's story sig-
nificantly reduced the contributions to Rokia. It may 
be that the .presence of statistics reduced the attention 
to Rokia essential for establishing the emotional con-
nection necessary to motivate donations. 
Alternatively, the recognition of the millions not 
being helped by one's donation may have produced 
negative affect that inhibited the response. 
A follow-up experiment by Small, Loewenstein, 
and Slovic (2007) provided additional evidence for 
the importance of feelings. Before being given the op-
portunity to donate, participants were either primed 
to feel ("Describe your feelings when you hear the 
word baby," and similar items) or to do simple arith-
metic calculations. Priming analytic thinking ( calcu-
lation) reduced donations to the identifiable victim 
(Rokia) relative to the feeling prime. Yet the two 
primes had no distinct effect on statistical victims, 
which is symptomatic of the difficulty in generating 
feelings for such victims. 
Annie Dillard read in her newspaper the headline 
"Head Spinning Numbers Cause Mind to Go Slack." 
She struggled to think straight about the great losses 
that the world ignores: "More than two million chil-
dren die a year from diarrhea and eight hundred 
thousand from measles. Do we blink? Stalin starved 
seven million Ukrainians in one year, Pol Pot killed 
one million Cambodians." She writes of "compassion 
fatigue" and asks, "At what number do other indi-
viduals blur for me?" (Dillard, 1999, pp. 130-131). 
An answer to Dillard's question is beginning to 
emerge from behavioral research. Studies by Hamilton 
and Sherman (1996) and Susskind et al. (1999) found 
that a single individual, unlike a group, is viewed as 
a psychologically coherent unit. This leads to more 
extensive processing of information and stronger im-
pressions about individuals than about groups. Con-
sistent with this, Kogut and Ritov (2005a, 2005b) 
found that people tend to feel more distress and com-
passion when considering an identified single victim 
than when considering a group of victims, even if 
identified. 
Specifically, Kogut and Ritov asked participants to 
contribute to a costly lifesaving treatment needed by a 
sick child or a group of eight sick children. The target 
amount needed to save the child (children) was the 
same in both conditions. All contributions were actu-
ally donated to children in need of cancer treatment. 
In addition, participants rated their feelings of distress 
(feeling worried, upset, and sad) toward the side child 
(children). 
The mean contributions are shown in figure 7.7. 
Contributions to the individuals in the group, as in-
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7.7. Mean contributions to individuals and their group. 
(Data from Kogut and Ritov, 2005b) 
dividuals, were far greater than were contributions to 
the entire group. Ratings of distress were also higher · 
in the individual condition. Kogut and Ritov con-
cluded that the greater donations to the single victim 
most likely stem from the stronger emotions evoked 
by such victims. 
Vastfjall, Peters, and Slovic (2010) decided to test 
whether the effect found by Kogut and Ritov would 
occur as well for donations to two starving children. 
Following the protocol designed by Small, Loew-
enstein, and Slovic (2007), they gave one group of 
Swedish students the opportunity to contribute their 
earnings from another experiment to Save the Chil-
dren to aid Rokia, whose plight was described as in 
the study by Small and coworkers. A second group 
was offered the opportunity to contribute their earn-
ings to Save the Children to aid Moussa, a seven-year-
old boy from Africa who was similarly described as 
in need of food aid. A third group was shown the 
vignettes and photos of Rokia and Moussa and was 
told that any donation would go to both of them, 
Rolcia and Moussa. The donations were real and were 
sent to Save the Children. Participants also rated their 
feelings about donating on a scale ofl (negative) to 5 
(positive). Mfect was found to be least positive in the 
combined condition, and donations were smaller in 
that condition (fig. 7.8). In the individual-child con-
ditions, the size of the donation made was strongly 
correlated with rated feelings ( r = .52 for Rokia; r = 
.52 for Moussa). However this correlation was much 
reduced ( r = .19) in the combined condition. 
As unsettling as is the valuation of lifesaving por-
trayed by the psychophysical model, the studies just 
described suggest an even more disturbing psycho-
logical tendency. Our capacity to feel is limited. To 
Rokia Moussa Rokia & 
Moussa 
30,----------------, 
7.8. Feelings and donations decline at N = 2! Mean 
affect ratings (left) and mean donations (right) for indi-
viduals and their combination. 
(Adapted from Vastfjall eta!., 2010) 
Number of lives at risk 
7.9. A model depicting psychic numbing-the collapse 
of compassion-when valuing the saving of lives. 
the extent that the valuation of lifesaving depends on 
feelings driven by attention or imagery, it might fol-
low the function shown in figure 7.9, where the emo-
tion or affective feeling is greatest at N = 1 but be-
gins to decline at N = 2 and collapses at some higher 
value of N that becomes simply "a statistic." In other 
words, returning to Dillard's worry about compassion 
fatigue, perhaps the "blurring" of individuals begins 
at two! Whereas Lifton (1967) coined the term psy-
chic numbing to describe the "turning off" of feeling 
that enabled rescue workers to function during the 
horrific aftermath of the Hiroshima bombing, fig-
ure 7.9 depicts a form of numbing that is not benefi-
cial. Rather, it leads to apathy and inaction, consistent 
with what is seen repeatedly in response to mass mur-
der and genocide. 
The failure of Moral Intuition 
Thoughtful deliberation takes effort. Fortunately evo-
lution has equipped us with sophisticated cognitive 
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and perceptual mechanisms that cail guide us through 
our daily lives efficiendy with minimal need for "deep 
thinking." We have referred to d1ese mechanisms as 
System l. 
Consider, for example, how we deal with risk. 
Long before we had invented probability theory, risk 
assessment, and decision analysis, there was intuition, 
instinct, and gut feeling, aided by experience, to tell 
us whether an animal was safe to approach or the 
water was safe to drink. As life became more complex 
and we gained more control over our environment, 
analytic ways of thinking, known as System 2, evolved 
to boost the rationality of our experiential reactions. 
Beyond the question of how water looks and tastes, 
we now look to toxicology and analytic chemistry to 
tell us whether the water is safe to drink (Slovic et al., 
2004). But we can still use our feelings as well, an 
easier path. 
As with risk, the natural and easy way to deal with 
moral issues is to rely on our intuitions: "How bad is 
it?" Well, how bad does it feel? We can also apply rea-
son and logical analysis to determine right and wrong, 
as our legal system attempts to do. But moral intu-
ition comes first and usually dominates moral judg-
ment unless we make an effort to use judgment to 
critique and, if necessary, override our intuitive feel-
ings (Haidt, 2001, 2007). 
Unfortunately, moral intuition fails us in the face 
of genocide and other disasters that threaten human 
lives and the environment on a large scale. As power-
ful as System l is, when infi.1sed with vivid experien-
tial stimulation (witness the moral outrage triggered 
by the photos of abuse at the Abu Ghraib prison in 
Iraq), it has a darker side. We cannot trust it. It de-
pends upon attention and feelings that may be hard 
to arouse and sustain over time for large numbers of 
victims, not to spealc of numbers as small as two. Left 
to its own devices, moral intuition will likely favor in-
dividual victims and sensational stories that are closer 
to home and easier to imagine. It will be distracted by 
images that produce strong, though erroneous, feel-
ings, like percentages as opposed to actual numbers. 
Our sizable capacity to care for others may also be 
overridden by more pressing personal interests. Com-
passion for others has been characterized by Batson 
et al. (1983) as "a fragile flower, easily crushed by 
self concern" (p. 718). Faced with genocide and other 
mass tragedies, we cannot rely on our moral intuitions 
alone to guide us to act properly. 
Philosophers such as Peter Singer (2007) and 
Peter Unger (1996), employing very different meth-
ods than psychologists, came to much the same con-
clusions about the unreliability of moral intuitions. 
Unger, after leading his readers through fifty inge-
nious thought experiments, urged them and us to 
think harder to overcome the morally questionable 
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appearances promoted by our intmnve responses. 
These intuitions, he argued, lead us to act in ways 
that are inconsistent with our true "Values," that is, 
the values we would hold after more careful delibera-
tion: "Folks' intuitive moral responses to specific cases 
derive from sources far removed from our Values and, 
so, they fail to reflect these Values, often even point-
ing in the opposite direction" (p. ll ). 
Greene (2008), drawing on data from psychology 
and neuroscience as well as philosophy, attempted to 
explain the problems with intuitions in terms of the 
morally irrelevant evolutionary factors that shaped 
these intuitions. Thus we say it is wrong to abandon a 
drowning child in a shallow pond but okay to ignore 
the needs of millions of starving children abroad. The 
former pushes our emotional buttons whereas the 
latter do not. And this may be because we evolved 
in an environment in which we lived in small groups 
and developed immediate, emotionally based intui-
rive responses to the needs and transgressions of oth-
ers. There was litde or no interaction with faraway 
strangers. 
Implications for International Law and Policy 
Clearly there are many serious obstacles to consistent, 
meaningful intervention to prevent genocide and 
similarly grave abuses. In addition to the more obvi-
ous political, material, and logistical impediments, the 
international community must overcome the psycho-
logical constraints described here. Indeed, the cogni-
tive limitations we identify make it much more dif-
ficult to mobilize global public sentiment in the way 
necessary to overcome the more obvious material and 
logistical constraints. The question is whether and 
how international law and institutions might be re-
formed to account for these cognitive limitations. In 
this section, we will canvass several implications of this 
research for the law and policy of atrocity prevention. 
Although we have emphasized the implications of 
this research for the problem of genocide, much of 
the psychological research obviously applies to viola-
tions involving large numbers of victims in general. 
The data are not limited to genocide. The research 
provides insight into the ways in which individuals 
react to mass human rights abuses such as widespread 
arbitrary detentions and denial of a population's right 
to food. As a consequence, the lessons that are rel-
evant to policy makers and practitioners relate broadly 
to the field of human rights. 
Several of the following proposals are ambitious-
especially those involving a change to the use-of-force 
regime-and that ambition raises questions about 
their political viability. But there are several factors 
that may increase their viability. First, attempts to 
identify and reduce psychic nu'mbing among elector-
ates may produce a political opportunity for insti-
tutional change-that is, to the extent that psychic 
numbing exists and is masking a preference for an-
tigenocide action, unmasking that preference may 
produce powerful political will. Second, political ac-
tors themselves may be more willing to embrace these 
various reforms if the changes are not intended to 
overcome political interests, but instead to overcome 
cognitive failures. The psychological research shows 
a collapse of rational calculation and evaluation that 
causes us to artificially devalue human life. Indeed, 
in some circumstances, the more widespread and sys-
tematic the violation, the weaker the reaction. At bot-
tom, the need for reform should be grounded in an 
understanding that cognitive deficiencies can prevent 
actors from realizing a preference for stopping mass 
human rights violations-even when doing so would 
serve their overall values and interests. 
Appreciation of the failure of moral intuition 
should inform the development of new legal rules and 
institutional arrangements concerned with atrocity 
prevention and human rights more generally. Indeed, 
it may only be laws and institutions that can keep us 
on course, forcing us to pursue the hard measures 
needed to combat massive human rights abuses when 
our attention strays and our feelings lull us into com-
placency. We accordingly propose several institutional 
designs to improve international decision making in 
this arena. We discuss several strategies (l) to insu-
late institutions from the effects of psychic numbing; 
(2) to remove or restrict institutional features that 
foster psychic numbing; (3) to promote System 2 
deliberation direcdy; and (4) to employ System l to 
channel actors toward System 2 processes. 
Insulate Institutions from the Effects of Psychic 
Numbing 
One approach is to insulate decision-making processes 
from the adverse psychological effects that we have 
identified. For example, policy makers might design 
institutions to be less susceptible to psychic numbing 
or to operate despite the psychological effects on ac-
tors within the institution. 
CONSTRUCT DEFAULT RULES AND PRECOMMITMENT 
DEVICES 
The international regime could construct precommit-
ment enforcement strategies to deal with genocide 
and other human rights atrocities of similar scale. 
Consider a few options: the UN Security Coun-
cil could preauthorize, subject perhaps to an ex post 
council override, the use of force in any situation in 
which atrocities reach a certain scale. Another possi-
bility is that the Security Council could order (rather 
than authorize) all member states to take coercive ac-
tion once the commission of atrocities reached a cer-
tain level. Alternatively, states could conclude a treaty 
in which state parties would preinvite foreign inter-
vention and/or UN peacekeepers in the event that 
genocide occurs on their own territory. 
Similarly, the psychological evidence provides a 
powerful reason for supporting the responsibility 
to protect, an emerging doctrine that shifts from a 
right of states to a duty of states to intervene in an-
other country to stop an atrocity (Wheeler, 2005). 
The novelty of the responsibility to protect is that 
states are under an affirmative obligation-not just a 
license-to intervene once the Security Council has 
authorized such action. The psychological findings 
provide an independent and unique reason to place 
pressure on states in the form of this legal responsibil-
ity. The starting point should favor intervention (at 
the very least when the Security Council has deter-
mined force is appropriate). 
Other precommitment strategies could be imple-
mented to insulate institutions from the effects of 
psychic numbing with respect to human rights more 
generally. Aside from the use-of-force regime, mul-
tilateral organizations could preauthorize economic 
sanctions on the part of their member states. Nations 
could pass domestic legislation that triggers such 
sanctions or automatically increases foreign aid in the 
event of a humanitarian catastrophe (and could per-
haps require repeal of such aid by a supermajority). 
States could preauthorize UN Special Rapporteurs to 
visit their country in the event of mass human rights 
violations. In all these instances, multilateral bodies, 
foreign countries, and the affected nation might be 
ill equipped-without the assistance of a precommit-
ment device-to confront a situation after deaths and 
deprivations begin to mount. 
Questions about whether and how to intervene in 
ongoing conflicts-militarily, economically, etc.-tend 
to occupy the field of the genocide-response debate, 
and one appealing feature of the psychic numbing 
literature is that it may offer a simple metric for de-
termining when to intervene. Say, for example, that 
valuations of life begin to drop off significantly after 
10 deaths. At 10 deaths, a preauthorized UN investi-
gation would automatically be triggered (implement-
ing new reporting methods, as discussed below); at 
100 deaths, that investigatory body would immedi-
ately acquire certain authorities. These lockstep provi-
sions can be justified on the grounds that any more-
subjective metric raises the risk of psychic numbing. If 
such a system could be implemented, it could limit the 
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opportunity for genocidaire states to stall international 
intervention under the guise of diplomatic debate. 
EMPHASIZE EARLY WARNING AND PREVENTIVE ACTION 
Another approach is to act before psychic numbing 
sets in. Apart from the fact that prevention is in many 
ways easier, less costly, and less difficult than inter-
vention (Hamburg, 2008), reaction strategies must 
necessarily overcome the psychic numbing generated 
by the instant crisis. This insight recommends a range 
oflaw and policy options including more vigorous in-
ternational monitoring or intervention in situations 
likely to generate wide-scale atrocities (e.g., civil wars, 
military coups, etc.) or even "anticipatory" hum ani-
tarian intervention (Richter and Stanton, n.d.). It 
recommends establishing a general, preventive disclo-
sure mechanism to preclude trafficking in resources 
that are at risk for funding human rights abuses, as a 
recent U.S. law attempts to do for conflict minerals 
in Congo. It also calls for greater financial and po-
litical support for criminal trials-if that instrument 
can be expected to deter future violations or to help 
halt cycles of violence. Prevention and reaction strat-
egies need not be mutually exclusive. Early-warning 
systems could feasibly be triggered after low numbers 
of deaths, but such triggers need not be more than an 
investigatory panel to assess the risks of the current 
situation, both for future harm and also the risk of 
psychic numbing as the situation develops. That is, 
early-warning systems can emphasize both prevention 
and preparation-in this case preparation for numb-
ing effects. 
EMPOWER INSTITUTIONS AND ACTORS LESS LIKELY TO 
SUCCUMB TO PSYCHIC NUMBING 
Psychological research also provides good reasons to 
support a form of subsidiarity within the humanitar-
ian rights and use-of-force regime. Regional and local 
actors who are closer to the situation are more likely 
to overcome System l limitations in comprehending 
the gravity of an atrocity. Accordingly, international 
law might provide regional organizations (e.g., the 
Economic Community ofWest Mrican States, theM-
rican Union) greater leeway to use force to stop geno-
cide before or even without Security Council action. 
The objective here is to create a one-way ratchet-
providing more proximate and local actors an option 
to intervene without complete international backing. 
The design would not work the other way; that is, to 
provide regional actors the authority to bar outside 
intervention by the international community. 
Regional actors could also be empowered in inter-
governmental settings involving enforcement measures 
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that do n:ot entail the use of force. Examples of such 
enforcement measures include formal resolutions 
condemning a state for extremely poor human rights 
conditions, the creation of a special rapporteur to 
monitor the country, the ouster of a state from an in·-
tergovernmental organization, and the imposition of 
economic sanctions. Voting rules could be fashioned 
whereby such measures would be adopted either if a 
majority of state parties approves or if a supermajority 
of states from the relevant region approve. For ex-
ample, the imposition of sanctions against Zimbabwe 
could be approved either ( 1) by a majority of all state 
parties to an international organization or (2) by ap-
proval of three-quarters of the African states even if 
a majority of the whole does not agree. Once again, 
these devices are intended to function as a one-way 
ratchet. Such a design principle would be important 
because of other political and psychological reasons 
that regional actors may otherwise protect their 
neighbors from enforcement actions. 
Outside monitoring and independent interna-
tional review are key components of the international 
regime. The foregoing discussion suggests that, in 
fact, outside reviewers may be more susceptible to 
numbing effects. Responding by empowering local 
actors to conduct investigations may not solve the 
numbing problem but may instead replace it with a 
neutrality problem if the local actors are less likely 
than their international counterparts to be impartial 
observers. One potential solution would be to turn to 
intermediate actors-regional bodies or hybrid local-
international bodies. Another would be to train, to 
the extent possible, the relevant rapporteurs to rec-
ognize and counter the risks of psychic numbing. 
But however the problem is addressed, institutional 
capacities must be assessed and-although it is not 
currently recognized as such-psychic numbing is a 
relevant factor to consider in making this assessment. 
Remove or Restrict Institutional Features That Foster 
Psychic Numbing 
CHANGE THE METHOD AND CONTENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
REPORTING 
By challenging the assumption that information makes 
positive change more likely, the research presented in 
this chapter calls into question one of the strategic 
pillars of human rights advocacy. Documentation-
including the presentation of data showing mass and 
systematic violations-is often thought to raise aware-
ness. Efforts by international organizations to docu-
ment mass human rights violations typically focus on 
the widespread nature of violations rather than on 
narratives or other information about the individuals 
who have been harmed. Statistics prevail over stories. 
A good example of this is the Darfur Atrocities Docu-
mentation Project (Totten, 2006 ), which compiled a 
database of over 10,000 eye-witnessed incidents but 
reported mostly the percentages of different types of 
abuses. 
International legal procedures amplify the prob-
lem. First, consider the strict page limitations that 
exist for reports to the UN Human Rights Council. 
These page constraints apply to reports by nongov-
ernmental organizations as well as to those by UN 
human rights officials. As a result, the authors of the 
reports condense information into compact pieces of 
data and are unable to delve deeply into descriptions 
of individuals' lives. Under these pressures, statistics 
are also considered an efficient method for conveying 
information. Second, in official settings little oppor-
tunity exists for conveying information in the form 
of visual media. Third, important international legal 
forums impose either an expressed or implicit require-
ment that violations meet a quantitative threshold 
(UN Human Rights Council's 1503 Complaints Pro-
cedure), which incentivizes advocates to frame their 
appeal through the representation oflarge numbers of 
cases. It is not difficult to conceive of innovations to 
repair these problems. Procedural and substantive re-
quirements could be softened or exceptions could be 
made to expand the forms of information conveyance. 
RECONSIDER HUMAN RIGHTS INDICATORS 
Many now call for the use of quantitative indicators 
in global governance (e.g., measures of good gover-
nance by the World Bank; see, e.g., Davis, Kingsbury, 
and Merry, 2010). The psychological research docu-
mented here suggests that significant perverse effects 
may result from the production, collection, and circu-
lation of quantitative human rights indicators. Actors 
involved in these processes may become desensitized 
to human rights violations, and such processes often 
involve some of the most important actors within 
government and civil society. These effects may not 
be a sufficient basis to abandon or restrict indicators; 
however, in the emerging debate about their utility, 
these risks should be carefully considered. 
Nevertheless, indicators can prove invaluable for 
monitoring and responding to psychic numbing. 
First, indicators can provide a valuable tool for track-
ing the likelihood of numbing effects-the larger the 
numbers involved, the greater the risks. Second, we 
can acknowledge the possibility that indicators might 
induce numbing without abandoning their use. In-
stead, we must be mindful of the difference between 
the collection of data and its final presented form. 
Data collection and data reporting could be done 
by different agencies, and data collectors should be 
guarded against numbing effects and also trained to 
look for stories that can serve to illustrate the signifi-
cance of a given atrocity. 
RECONSIDER SUBSTANTIVE ELEMENTS OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW 
Even the substantive law of genocide might be con-
sidered problematic since it conceptualizes genocide 
as a collective or group injury rather than as harm 
to individuals. As a result of the legal definition, the 
discourse surrounding the presentation of grievances 
may focus too extensively on the group-based harms. 
In this light, it is instructive to reflect on the charac-
terization by a Holocaust survivor, Abel Hertzberg: 
"There were not six million Jews murdered: there was 
one murder, six million times" (U.S. Holocaust Me-
morial Museum, 2005). 
The definition of crimes against humanity raises 
a similar concern. Generally defined as a "widespread 
and systematic" attack against a civilian population, 
the elements of the crime might emphasize the rep-
resentation of aggregate numbers rather than of in-
dividual cases. The particular definition of crimes 
against humanity in the UN Statute for the Rwanda 
Tribunal includes an unusual requirement: that the 
attack be directed against a "civilian population on 
national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds." 
That definition (which was altered in the treaty for 
the International Criminal Court) is subject to some 
of the same concerns as the group-based focus of 
genocide. 
Employ System 1 to Activate and Support System 2 
Processes 
Despite the limitations of System 1 noted above, we 
should nevertheless attempt to bolster it, at least so it 
can motivate support for efforts based on System 2. 
Such attempts should capitalize on the findings de-
scribed earlier demonstrating that we care most about 
aiding individual people in need, even more so when 
we can attach a name and a face to them. 
AFFECTIVE IMAGERY 
The data in this chapter present a striking irony: in an 
effort to emphasize objective facts, the human rights 
regime risks losing its ability to connect with sympa-
thizers on a human level. To be sure, we do not ad-
vocate wholesale abandonment of current reporting 
mechanisms or the exclusive adoption of emotion-
laden stories. After all, the goal of overcoming psy-
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chic numbing is to better calibrate our interventions 
to the scale of the atrocities that we face. But there is 
ample room for the future of human rights reporting 
to exhibit mixed methodologies. 
The increasing availability of mixed media may 
help in this regard. As people post visceral digital con-
tent depicting human rights abuses, audiences may 
exhibit responses that otherwise had been masked by 
numbing effects. InApril2010, the website Wtkileaks 
posted video of U.S. soldiers firing indiscriminately 
upon civilians in Iraq, creating a media and politi-
cal uproar. Dozens of news reports had already re-
ported on the problem of indiscriminate targeting, 
none of which garnered the same attention as the 
online video. The same phenomenon can be said of 
the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal-during the 
entire U.S. occupation of Iraq, nothing created the 
same backlash as the release of the photos of prisoner 
mistreatment, despite several reports that, although 
less colorful, suggested much more violent and more 
widespread practices. 
Thus, one possibility is to infuse human rights 
reporting with powerful affective imagery, such as 
that associated with Hurricane Katrina, the South-
east Asian tsunami, and the earthquake in Haiti. This 
would require pressure on the media to report the 
slaughter of innocent people aggressively and vividly. 
Another way to engage our experiential system would 
be to bring people from abused populations into our 
communities and our homes to tell their stories. 
Above we discussed the disadvantages of reports 
that focus on the numbers of violations. While it is 
obviously necessary to document the scope of such 
atrocities, neglecting the stories of individuals cer-
tainly contributes to numbing. Human rights advo-
cates should reorient the documentation and report-
ing of abuses to prompt System 1 thinldng. In some 
cases, in-depth narratives and visual personal stories 
describing the predicament of individual victims 
should be emphasized instead of more abstract de-
scriptions of the scale of abuses-that is, stories over 
statistics. 
At the same time, scale and systematicity presum-
ably remain important for calibrating the appropriate 
response to any human rights problem. As a conse-
quence, human rights documentation should not 
abandon the reporting of scale and system-level ef-
fects. The central challenge of applying the psycho-
logical research to human rights advocacy is iden-
tifying when or how many "statistics" and when or 
how much "storytelling" should be employed in the 
documentation and reporting of abuses. Arresting 
visual displays (such as that shown in fig. 7.5) and 
photographs of victims and atrocities should be in-
cluded in the reporting and in the publicly distributed 
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information presented by human rights advocates. 
Indeed, the future success of the human rights move-
ment requires training not only advocates skilled in 
documenting large numbers of cases and professionals 
skilled in quantitative methods, but also profession-· 
als skilled in composing and representing narratives 
about the lives of individual victims. A good example 
of a policy report that was turned into a powerful nar-
rative is the 9/11 Commission Report (National Com-
mission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 
2004), which was written by professional writers and 
published by a major publishing house, both of which 
contributed to its wide public consumption. Unique 
for a policy report, it was a best seller in 2004 and a 
finalist for the National Book Award. 
On this last point, Paul Farmer (2005) wrote elo-
quently about the power of images, narratives, and 
first-person testimony to overcome our "failure of 
imagination" in contemplating the fate of distant, suf-
fering people. Such documentation can, he asserted, 
render abstract struggles personal and help make 
human rights violations "real" to those unlikely to 
suffer them. But he is aware, as well, of the limitations 
of this information. He quoted Susan Sontag (2003), 
who cautioned that "as one can become habituated 
to harm in real life, one can become habituated to 
the harm of certain images" (p. 82). Sparking emo-
tion with testimony and photographs, Farmer argued, 
is one thing; "linking them effectively, enduringly, to 
the broader project of promoting basic rights ... is 
quite another" (p. 185). In short, he said, "serious 
social ills require in-depth analyses" (p. 185). 
Further caveats about the use of atrocity images 
were expressed by Zelizer (1998), who argued that 
the recycling of images, such as photos of starving 
children in refugee camps, bears an eerie resemblance 
to photos from the Holocaust, which undermine their 
novelty and immediacy and can dull our responses. 
Similarly, Just (2008), reviewing the plethora of excel-
lent books and movies on Darfur, observed that the 
horror they vividly depict should disgust us, but 
one effect of the extraordinary amount of knowl-
edge we have about Darfur is that these stories 
eventually run together and lose their power to 
shock. . .. Repetition eventually numbs the moral 
imagination .... It is a terrible thing to admit, 
but the more information we consume about 
Darfur, the less shocking each piece of new infor-
mation seems .... Ignorance is not the only ally 
of indifference; sometimes knowledge, too, blunts 
the heart and the will. (p. 41) 
Another serious concern is the distributional ef-
fects of information conveyance that relies on images, 
narratives, and storytelling. The types of individuals 
and lifestyles that will trigger emotional connections 
may be implicitly affected by race, sexual orientation, 
gender, class, and the like. One must be especially 
concerned about a medium in which culturally disem-
powered groups ofren lose to more "compelling" sto-
ries of popular and culturally similar groups. Consider 
the case of Darfurees and the American news media. 
According to the Tyndall Report, which monitors 
American television coverage, ABC News allotted 
a total of 18 minutes on the Darfur genocide in its 
nightly newscasts in 2004, NBC had only 5 minutes, 
and CBS only 3 minutes. Martha Stewart received 
vastly greater coverage, as did Natalee Holloway, the 
American girl missing in Aruba. 
VICTIM EMPOWERMENT 
Another domain is victim empowerment. Where Sys-
tem 2 processes are systematically lacking, victims 
could be empowered to trigger a range of institu-
tional responses such as initiating international court 
proceedings, placing an issue on the agenda of an in-
ternational political body, or making a presentation as 
part of the deliberative process. Human rights organi-
zations, including the UN Office of the High Com-
missioner for Human Rights, could personally involve 
victims in making such presentations or reading their 
organization's statement before such bodies. In the 
abstract, such measures risk biasing decision makers 
toward System 1 emotional responses, which would 
be inappropriate in certain decision-making forums. 
Regime designers would need to consider the condi-
tions for crafring such interventions primarily to prod 
System 2 mechanisms into action when they are oth-
erwise deficient. 
Directly Promote System 2 Deliberation 
Even when System 1 's moral intuitions are distorted, 
human cognition can rely on the rational, deliberative 
mode of thinking characteristic of System 2. Where 
emotion and affect let us down, we still can be spurred 
into action if we can trigger a deliberative process ca-
pable of weighing the costs and benefits of possible 
intervention options. In short, institutional design 
should focus on ways to directly engage System 2 in 
the consideration of mass human rights violations. 
The role of psychology in mediating our reactions 
to genocide may suggest the promise of a supplemen-
tal remedy, one that, paradoxically, is actually quite 
modest on its face-a "less is more" approach to the 
international legal regime combating genocide. Rather 
than solely focusing on obligations to act, interna-
tional and domestic law should also require actors to 
deliberate and reason about actions to take in response 
to genocide, thereby engaging System 2 cognition in 
order to overcome psychic numbing. The obligation 
to deliberate should apply to omissions (e.g., the fail-
ure to respond meaningfully to a genocide) as well 
as to acts. Psychological research indicates that this 
simple act of reasoned decision making may help over-
come cognitive obstacles to intervention. 
Can legal institutions in fact promote deliberation, 
either among policy malcers or among the general pub-
lic? Although the law is typically conceived as being 
concerned with action and not deliberation, institu-
tional designers have talcen just such an approach in a 
number of areas oflaw and policy, seeking to promote 
better outcomes not just by regulating the end result 
of the decision-making process but by regulating the 
process itself as well. One important example is the 
legal requirement in many countries that governmen-
tal agencies produce environmental impact statements 
before taking actions that might have deleterious en-
vironmental effects. These procedural requirements 
are often self-consciously deliberation-forcing mecha-
nisms: they do not bar agency action that would harm 
the environment; they simply require that these effects 
be considered. And while the success of such laws in 
actually altering outcomes has been debated, advo-
cates for the environment have at least taken them 
seriously enough to push for enforcement of such re-
quirements in the courts, even without a guarantee 
that the ultimate policy decision will be affected. 
A more broadly applicable example from U.S. ad-
ministrative law is the requirement that cost-benefit 
analysis be performed in the course of deciding 
whether to regulate or to not regulate. While cost-
benefit analysis was initially considered a means for 
achieving deregulatory results, recent developments 
in the administrative state have illustrated the analy-
sis's potential for promoting the consideration of 
beneficial regulations (Hahn and Sunstein, 2002). 
Applied without a deregulatory bias, this policy might 
be viewed as a deliberation-forcing rule to insure 
that the government does not fail to consider po-
tential welfare-promoting actions. Consider another 
example of deliberation-forcing devices in legislative 
affairs. In the landmark case Doctors for Life Inter-
national (2006), the South African Constitutional 
Court enforced a constitutional provision requiring 
participatory democracy by ordering the legislature 
to hold public hearings and debates. The court drew 
inspiration from similar constitutional requirements 
in other countries. All of these examples demonstrate 
a concern with the quality of deliberation given to 
controversial government decisions and manifest an 
expectation that improved deliberation can result in 
improved decisions, even without mandating what 
the final decision itself must be. 
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These examples indicate that pursuing a deliber-
ation-forcing approach to antigenocide efforts would 
not be unprecedented as a supplemental legal tool 
designed to overcome the cognitive obstacles in the 
way of interventions. Moreover, because it requires 
"only" deliberation, states may be more willing to 
take on such obligations. At the international level, 
an additional protocol to the Genocide Convention 
could compel states to respond to genocide by pro-
ducing a detailed action plan, factoring in the likely 
costs and benefits of different types of intervention. 
At regular intervals, states could be required to justify 
their failure to act based on an updated assessment of 
costs and benefits. And the treaty could require high-
visibility public presentation of these findings before 
both international and domestic audiences. The re-
porting requirements could also specify engagement 
at both the elite decision-making level (e.g., requiring 
the participation of the security establishment) and 
involvement at the popular level (e.g., requiring dis-
semination of information and hearings designed to 
reach the public). In addition, the UN Security Coun-
cil could create a genocide committee to monitor and 
receive state reports and to ensure that state reports 
are timely and do not constitute foot-dragging. Such 
a committee would be analogous to the 1540 Com-
mittee, which was established to monitor and coordi-
nate national nonproliferation efforts. Finally, at the 
national level, legislatures and executives can require 
hearings and reports evaluating the costs and benefits 
of intervention and nonintervention. The important 
point is that a procedural obligation to deliberate may 
be less onerous but more likely to yield meaningful 
substantive responses in the advent of genocide. 
Conclusion 
Drawing upon behavioral research and common 
observation, we argue here that we cannot depend 
only upon our moral intuitions to motivate us to 
talce proper action against genocide and mass abuse 
of human rights. This analysis places the burden of 
response squarely upon moral argument and interna-
tional law. The genocide convention was supposed to 
meet this need, but it has not been effective. It is time 
to reexamine this failure in light of the psychological 
deficiencies described here and design legal and insti-
tutional mechanisms that will compel us to respond 
to genocide and other mass harms with a degree of 
intensity that is commensurate with the high value we 
place on individual human lives. 
The stakes are high. Failure to overcome psychic 
numbing may condemn us to witness another century 
of genocide and mass abuses of innocent people. 
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